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ABSTRACT
This paper models the supply of perishable goods within a randon framework. Perishability aﬀects a large group
of goods usually traded in the economy such as fruits and vegetables, newspapers, medicine drugs, a.s.o.. Surprisingly,
one cannot ﬁnd in the literature a decision model for suppliers that takes into account the speciﬁcity of this kind of
goods. The suppliers guess their demand by choosing a probability density function, one at each price level. Then
they choose optimal supply functions maximizing their expected proﬁts. Examples of the optimal solution are given
for some known demand distribution functions like Pareto and Weibull. The autarchic model is then extended to
include nonprice competition among the sellers. Each seller chooses the supply curve that maximizes his expected
proﬁt, conditioned by the event that competitors’ markets are in equilibrium. The supply of rivals aﬀect the sales
for certain to loyal clients, but not the random sales. The autarchic model is then used to analyze the green-pepper
market in Rio de Janeiro(1994/7-2000/11). The results give consistency to the rational hypothesis of the model.
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1I - Introduction
This paper models the supply of perishable goods within a random framework.
Perishability aﬀects a large group of goods usually traded in the economy such as fruits
and vegetables, newspapers, medicine drugs, a.s.o.. Surprisingly, one cannot ﬁnd in
the literature a decision model for suppliers that takes into account the speciﬁcity of
this kind of goods. An important feature of trading perishables is that the market
clearing requires a prompt response of the buyers to the supply of sellers. When
the amount unsold at a given date cannot be stocked and transferred to subsequent
periods, losses may reach up to 100% of overall costs. This suggests to treat the
quantity demanded as a random variable rather than a deterministic one.
Formal approaches modelling the market of perishables most often focus on price
determination, competition, or price linkages among the production, wholesale and
retail sectors. Models of price determination are considered in Gardner (1975) and
Heien (1980). Other empirical studies estimate demand and supply curves deﬁned
exogenously. Concerns for the eﬀects of uncertainty in trading perishable goods can be
found in Fraser(1995). Sexton and Zhang(1996) built a price determination model at
farm level which is used to test the assumption of a competitive behavior of buyers
i nt h eC a l i f o r n i ai c e b e r gl e t t u c em a r k e t . T h ep r e s e n tp a p e rd o e sn o tm o d e lp r i c e
determination. In the decision making, the sellers choose quantities by taking input
and output prices as given. Grossman(1981) and Klemperer and Meyer(1989) also
2model supply curves given prices, but they do it in a diﬀerent framework.
Given the demand distribution function and the level of prices, a relevant problem
that a supplier faces is choosing the amount he should supply in order to maximize
expected proﬁt. In this regard, the short life-cycle of the good allows to insert the
decision rule within a one-period setting. In the present model, the seller takes into
account two possible losses: (i) the accounting loss incurred with the depreciation
of the quantity unsold; (ii) the economic loss incurred with a demand in excess of
supply, estimated as a proportion of the opportunity cost of the undersupply. The
probability densities will depend on product prices. Before choosing his supply level,
the seller guesses its actual demand by choosing a function belonging to a family of
distributions, one at each price level.
By holding prices and technology constants, our model may appear to resemble
the perfect competition model. But in fact, it diverts from the latter at least in
two aspects. First, the optimal condition does not require a price-marginal cost
equalization, as in the competitive model. Here, the supplier maximizes expected
proﬁt by equating the probability of insuﬃcient demand with an increasing function
of the price-marginal cost margin. If the margin is null, then it is optimal to supply,
at the most, to committed clients only. Second, even if one assumes that the sellers
interact with one another, the maximizing behavior will not imply the market clearing.
The optimal supply (S) is a deterministic function while the demand (X) remains a
3random variable.
Our approach shows some interesting features that are not present in previous
models of supply determination: a) The optimal supply S in the retail segment is
also a demand function in the wholesale segment. Thus, if c and p are the wholesale
and retail prices respectively,S (p,c) is an increasing function of p at each c and a
decreasing function of c at each p. Moreover, the price-elasticity of the supply at retail
equates the negative of the price-elasticity of the demand at wholesale :  Sp(p;c)=
− Dc(c;p). The supply curve depends on the parameters of the demand distribution;
the estimation of the curve also gives us estimates for these parameters; b) Adequate
parametrization of the support of the demand distribution allows to evaluate the
importance of its deterministic component; c) When the quantities committed to loyal
customers are not signiﬁcant, an analysis of losses can be carried out by estimating
the probability of getting negative proﬁts at each period.
As a natural extension to the model, nonprice competition among several suppliers
is considered in section III. Given the vector of prices, the supply of competitors aﬀect
the sales committed to loyal clients, but not the random sales of the supplier. The
seller chooses the supply that maximizes his expected proﬁt, conditioned by the event
that competitors are in equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, the interactive solution
is a linear transformation of the optimal supply curves obtained in autarchy.
In order to give an illustration, the autarchic model is used in section IV to
4analyze the green-peppers retail market in Rio de Janeiro 1994/7 to 2000/11.
II- The autarchic model
Let S be the retailer quantity supplied (S N 0), and p t h ep r o d u c tp r i c e( p>0).
The demand X is assumed to be an absolutely continuous random variable with
density f deﬁned on the support [a,b),b > a N 0,w i t hﬁnite variance. The density
depends on a parametric vector ξ a n do nt h ep r i c el e v e l p. At point X = x, it will
be noted f(x;ξ,p). Let C be the nonnegative and increasing cost function, deﬁned
on the supply space. We assume C is two times continuously diﬀerentiable.
Consider the event A =[ X  S]: demand is no greater than supply. Let 1A be
the indicator function of A : 1A(x)=1if x ∈ A and =0if ω / ∈ A.
The objective function . We assume that the seller maximizes expected earn-
ings. When A occurs and the seller succeed in recovering a proportion δ (0  δ < 1) of
the cost of the excess supply, the proﬁt obtained when the demand is X is given
by: pX − C(S)+δ(C(S) − C(X)). When Ac =[ X>S ] occurs, the opportunity
cost of a shortage of supply relative to demand is: p(X − S) − (C(X) − C(S)). Let
τ N 0 be the proportion of the opportunity cost that the supplier is willing to deduct
from his potential revenue pS − C(S). Then, his net economic earning will be:
pS − C(S) − τ[p(X − S) − C(X)+C(S)]. If L indicates the net earning, we have:
L(X,S;p) ≡ [pX − C(S)+δ(C(S) − C(X))]1A +[pS − C(S) − τ(p(X − S) −
C(X)+C(S))]1Ac. Since 1A + 1Ac =1we obtain, after simplifying:
5L(X,S;p)=[ ( 1+τ)pS − τpX + τC(X) − (1 + τ)C(S)]+
[(1 + τ)p(X − S)+ ( τ + δ)(C(S) − C(X))]1A (1)
The inclusion of the opportunity cost in the objective function is also justiﬁed
because of the possibility of discontinuity in the demand. For example, suppose a
consumer only purchases n units. In this case, it may be that sales fall short of S
even when Ac =[ X>S ] occurs. It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd numerical examples showing
that the present speciﬁcation may include the accounting proﬁta sw e l la st h ee ﬀective
proﬁt ,a c c o r d i n gt od i ﬀerent values of the parameter τ. When τ =0 ,t h eo b j e c t i v e
function (1) is simply a proﬁt function.
Let Π(S;p) be the expected earning when supply is S and retail price is p. Then:
Π(S;p) ≡ EL =[ ( 1+τ)pS − τpEX + τEC(X) − (1 + τ)C(S)]+
U S
a [(1 + τ)p(x − S)+ ( τ + δ)(C(S) − C(x))]f(x;ξ,p)dx. (2)
Supply curves. For meaningful economic values of the supply, i.e., S N a and
C (S)  p, one can check that Π is a concave function of S, provided that the cost
function C i sc o n v e xo rn o tt o oc o n c a v ef o rt h e s ev a l u e so f S. Under this assumption,
the ﬁrst order equation ∂Π/∂S =0gives the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the expected earnings to be globally maximized in S. Applying the Leibnitz rule in
the derivation of (2) we obtain the ﬁrst order condition:
U S
a f(x;ξ,p)dx =
(1 + τ)[p − C (S)]
(1 + τ)[p − C (S)] + (1 − δ)C (S)
(3)
6The l.h.s. of the above equation gives the probability that demand is not greater
than supply. If F stands for the cumulative distribution function of X, the l.h.s. is:
F(S)=P(X  S). Now, let λ(S) ≡ [p −C (S)]/p be the price-marginal cost margin
(Lerner index). A simpler solution in S is obtained by assuming constant marginal
cost: C  = c>0. In this case, the equation (3) simpliﬁes to:
F(S)=
(1 + τ)λ
(1 + τ)λ +( 1− δ)(1 − λ)
(4)
In order to have a clear interpretation of the optimal condition, assume τ =
δ =0 . In this case (4) reduces to F(S)=λ. Thus, the optimum requires the amount
supplied must be such that the probability of oversupply equates the mark-up (p −
c)/p. This implies that S will be an increasing function of p and a decreasing function
of c. Further, if λ =0 , we obtain S  a. So, in the competitive case (p = c),t h e
seller will supply, at the most, to committed customers only.
Our assumptions ensure that F admits an inverse F−1. Therefore,
S(λ,τ,δ)=F−1(
(1 + τ)λ
(1 + τ)λ +( 1− δ)(1 − λ)
)( 5 )
Viewed as a function of τ,S (τ) increases, meaning that the supply maximizing
the expected proﬁt is a lower bound for the family of curves that maximize expected
earnings: S(0)  S(τ). The rationale is simple: if supply shortages are also penalized
(τ > 0), the seller is led to supply larger quantities than he would do if only oversupply
was penalized (τ =0 ).
To oﬀer an illustration, the supply curves generated in the Pareto and Weibull
7models are given below. Both admit an explicit inverse F−1.
a) Pareto demand distribution. The probability density function equals 0 for





]γ+1 for x N A(p); γ > 2.A stands for the
deterministic component of the demand, to be estimated from the data. When the
retail price is p, loyal clients commit to buy from the seller A(p) quantities. It seems
reasonable to assume that A is a nonincreasing function of prices. The expected
demand is: EX =(
γ
γ − 1
)A(p). The ﬁgure below shows the density of the demand




FIG.1: Pareto demand for two price levels
The distribution function is: F(S;γ,A(p)) = 1−(
A(p)
S
)γ for S N A(p) and equal
to 0 otherwise. By using equation (5) we obtain the following supply function:











FIG.2: Supply for Pareto demand distribution
b) Weibull demand distribution. The density function equals 0
for x<a (p) and fx(x; α,β,a(p)) = βα[α(x − a(p))]β−1e−[α(x−a(p)]β for x N
a(p), where α e β > 0 are parameters. The case β =1gives the truncated exponential







β−1e−xdx is the gamma function. The distribution function is Fx(x)=1−






















A direct derivation of (8) w.r.t. p (or c) allows us to obtain the price-elasticity of
the supply (demand) in the retail market (wholesale market):
 Sp =
(1 + τ)
αββ[(1 + τ)λ +( 1− δ)(1 − λ)](S − a)β−1S
= − Dc (9)
III- The interactive model: nsellers
A natural extension of the model is to allow for interactions among two or more
suppliers of close related goods. In real world, often it is observed signiﬁcant changes
in the quantity supplied by the ﬁrms that are not followed by signiﬁcant changes in
market prices. These changes can be accounted for advertising practises, exogenous
changes in the horizontal characteristics of the goods or trading facilities, like best
locations or greater number of retail outlets. Spillover eﬀects of marketing strategies
adopted by the individual ﬁrms lead to the enlargement of the market and/or to
predation (business-stealing eﬀect). In the extended model, sellers go on choosing
supply quantities maximizing their expected proﬁts at each price level p. However,
they now take into account that exogenous shifts in the quantities supplied by rivals
may aﬀect, positively or negatively, the sales to their loyal clients. By considering
such supply interactions, we intend to examine the conditions under which the optimal
sales of the autarchic regime could be either expanded or contracted by introducing
nonprice interactions among the sellers. The demand side is modelled by a conditional
10probability function for each producer.
There are n suppliers of perishable goods, each one facing the conditional demand
density fi(x,ξi|X1 = S1;...;Xi−1 = Si−1;Xi+1 = Si+1...Xn = Sn), where ξi is a
parameter vector. Each supplier looks to his demand density assuming that the
supply of the other matches their demand. All sellers have loyal clients, so that the
probabilities are positive if Xi >A i > 0. Marginal costs are constant. The supplier i
chooses the supply Si that maximizes his expected proﬁtf u n c t i o nL(X;Si,ξi) deﬁned
according to (1), with τi =0 . Let X−i,S −i be the demand and supply vectors
obtained by deleting the ith component of X and S. The equilibrium condition (4)
holds for each producer so that:
Fi(Si;ξi|X−i = S−i)=
λi
λi +( 1− δi)(1 − λi)
,i=1 ,...,n. (10)
The optimal supply curves are obtained by solving the system (10). Such a solu-
tion depends parsimoniously on the speciﬁcation of the conditional distribution. We
assume that the supplies of the competitors aﬀect only the sales for certain of the
supplier, not his random sales. More precisely, a linear relationship is considered:
Ai(pi;S−i)=ai(pi)+
Sn
j=1(j =i) kijSj; i =1 ,2,...,n (11)
Ac o e ﬃcient |kij| < 1 gives the spillover eﬀect of the supply of j over the demand
committed to i. Since prices are constant, when kij > 0 any market policy generating
an expansion of the j s supply induces also an increase in the sales for sure of the
good i. This causes the i’s supply curve to shift upward. If kij < 0, a predatory eﬀect
11is in force, the expansion of the j’s supply causes the seller’s i market to reduce. If
kij =0=kji, the supplies are independent so that the interactive solution matches
the autarchic solution.
In order to improve the visibility of the interactive solution we use a multiplicative
structure for the coeﬃcients: kij = φiζj.I f φ and ζ indicate the column-vectors of
these coeﬃcients, we write the n × n matrix of these coeﬃcients as [kij]=φζ
 . Note
now the diagonal matrix ∆ ≡ Diag(φζ
 ). Thus, the equation system (11) has the
following matrix representation:
A(p,S)=a(p)+( φζ
  − ∆)S (12)
In this system, the jth component of vectors a(p) and S are aj(pj) and Sj.
Nash equilibrium. Assume, without loss of generality, the truncate Weibull
model and note: Bi(pi) ≡ (Ln[1 +
λi
(1 − δi)(1 − λi)
])(1/βi). As shown by equation (7),




Ai(pi,S −i) in the previous equation by its value given in (11) and recalling that the




Bi(pi), we arrive to:
Si(pi;S−j)=
Sn
j=1(j =i) kijSj + Sa
i (pi),i=1 ,2,...,n.To this system we can give the
following matrix representation: S(p)=( φζ
 −∆)S(p)+Sa(p). Thus, the interactive
optimal supplies So
i(p) are linear combinations of the supplies in autarchy:
So(p)=( I + ∆ − φζ
 )−1Sa(p)( 1 3 )










j(pj) ,i , j=1 ,2.
Assume symmetric spillovers: φiζj = k.In this case, the inverse matrix in






1 − (n − 1)k
11 ]Sa(p) (14)
where 1 is the vector of ones. From (14) it is easily checked that:
1 So(p)=
1
1 − (n − 1)k
1 Sa(p)( 1 5 )
The optimal supplies are well deﬁned only for k<
1
n − 1




, we have 1 So(p) > 1 Sa(p), and the aggregate supply is greater than that
of autarchy. If k =0we have 1 So(p)=1 Sa(p) and if k<0 the interactive
supply is smaller than that of autarchy. If k>0, symmetric positive spillovers are
in force. The marketing strategies of the individual sellers stimulate one another
to supply greater quantities. Since price changes are not allowed, for the aggregate
supply to rise above the autarchy level, the spillover eﬀe c tc a n n o tb et o os t r o n g .F o r
example, a k =1 /10 ensures an interactive supply higher than the autarchic level
only if n  10. If k<0, negative spillovers create a business stealing eﬀect that
shifts the supply curves downward. The ultimate aggregate supply is lower than that
obtained in autarchy.
Estimation. If data on prices p and c, and individual supplies Si are available
during T periods, the two-step procedure described below can be used to estimate the
unknown parameters of the model. In the 1st stage, the optimal autarchy supplies Sa
i
13are estimated separately, for each seller i, as it is shown ahead, in section IV. This
also provides the estimates e ai(p) for the deterministic demand. In the 2nd stage, the
coeﬃcients kij from equation (13) are estimated by using the observed supplies Si
and e ai(p). For this aim, the following n-equation system is to be considered: e ai(pi)=
Ai −
Sn
j=1(j =i) kijSj ,i=1 ,2,...,n. We may view that as a seemingly unrelated
equation system. The parameters Ai and −kij can be estimated by the SUR method
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression). Once the estimators e kij (i  = j) are obtained, the
solution vector So is found by using the equivalent of the equation (13) : So(p)=
(I − e K)−1Sa(p), where e K =[ e kij] with e kii ≡ 0.
Meaning of the estimates. By assuming that all supplies So
i are positive, the
sign of the estimates e kij allows the supplier i to know the predatory (e kij < 0), neutral
( e kij =0 )or beneﬁcial (e kij > 0) eﬀect generated by the marketing practices of each of
his partners j =1 ,2,...,n (j  = i). On the other hand, at each observed price vector
p, the comparison of the actual position Si with the optimal supplies under autarchy
and nonprice competition provides to a seller i useful information for evaluating his
own market position. The following cases may occur:
a) Si  Sa
i  So
i or Si  So
i  Sa
i : the seller i is a poor-performer and there is an
indication that the status quo is the worst position to him; b) Sa
i  So
i  Si or So
i 
Sa
i  Si : the seller i is a good-performer and there is an indication that the status quo
is the best position to him. In the two other cases, So
i  Si  Sa (Sa
i  Si  So
i) the
14seller i might implement his market position with less(more) nonprice competition.
IV- Application to the green-pepper market
The autarchic model presented in Section II is used to analyze the market of
green-peppers in Rio de Janeiro(Brasil): 1994/July-2000/November.
4.1 Data and estimated equations
The monthly quantities demanded and prices payed by the retailers in the
wholesale market are collected from CEASA-Irajá, a state-owned supermarket serving
about 70% of the fruit and vegetables market in the metropolitan Rio area. The retail
prices were provided by the Price Service of the City Government of Rio de Janeiro.
Wholesale and retail prices were deﬂated by using the wholesale price index (IPA-DI),
calculated by the Getulio Vargas Foundation(FGV), and the national consumer price
index (INPC), published by the National Bureau of Geography and Statistics(IBGE).
The equations are estimated under several random assumptions: Uniform, Pareto,
Exponential and Weibull. The marginal cost borne by the retailers is assumed to be
constant. Wholesalers usually discriminate prices by granting discounts to customers
buying higher quantities. This reduces the unit costs and the total cost becomes
a concave function of the quantities. However, a nonlinear price assumption would
introduce needless mathematical diﬃculties, making it uneasy to explicit the supply
functions from equation (3). Further, the concavity of wholesale prices could destroy
the concavity of the expected proﬁt function, a property that is necessary to obtain
15the maximizing solution. Fortunately, estimations run with aggregate data attenuate
the bias of the linearity assumption.
4.2 Value-added and gross proﬁtability in the retail sector
The mean quantities traded monthly in CEASA-Rio during the period 1994/7-
2000/11 is 1806.07 tons of pepper. Part of the aggregate demand that wholesalers face
is formed by orders issued from hotels, hospitals, restaurants and other institutions.
The larger part of total demand(about 90%)i sf o r m e db ym i d d l e - t r a d e r ss u p p l y i n gf o r
secondary markets or by ﬁnal retailers that sell the goods directly to ﬁnal customers.
During the period, the traded quantities show a modest increase of 0.29%, i.e. about
5.23 tons per month. The value-added is measured by the diﬀerence between the value
o ft h eq u a n t i t i e st r a d e da tr e t a i lp r i c e sa n di t sv a l u ea tt h ew h o l e s a l ep r i c e s . It is a
gross trading margin for the retail sector, including proﬁts and trading costs. Its
value increases about 0.6% monthly during the sample period, and the mean price-
cost margin is λ ≡ 0.76. The high value of λ is an indication that the trading channel
between wholesalers and consumers could be rather long, implying the existence of
secondary markets for the product.
4.3 Econometric estimations
The parameters of diﬀerent supply equations have been estimated for values τ =1
and τ =0of the opportunity cost parameter. T h ee s t i m a t e so b t a i n e df o rb o t hv a l u e s
of τ are very similar, so that only the case τ =0is presented. This implies that the
16suppliers are maximizing accounting proﬁts. The joint estimation of δ and the other
parameters by nonlinear methods is complicated by the singularity of the matrix of the
data. Additional variables or extra-sample information would be required to estimate
all parameters. Therefore, three hypothesis on the eﬃciency level of the liquidation
market have been considered: δ =0 , 0.5 and 0.9. Preliminary unit-root tests for
all series used in the regressions were performed. Fortunately, in all cases, ADF and
Phillips-Perron statistics lead to the rejection of the null hypotheses, so that the
dependent variable and the regressor are stationary. Thus, the Least Squares method
provides unbiased and consistent estimators for the parameters. The Weibull model
with a =0 , performed a better adjustment to the data. The sample shows low
wholesale trading levels during June, July and August. In order to capture seasonal
eﬀects, a dummy variable was introduced in the supply equation (8),w i t hc o e ﬃcient
η as appearing in Table 1. The estimated mean of sales to ﬁnal demand is 1507.5
tons/month, for δ =0 . The diﬀerence w.r.t. the observed mean is 294.5 tons/month,
or about 16.34% of the supply. The underestimation may be explained by the non
signiﬁcance of the committed sales in the estimated model. Table 1 also shows the
mean value of the price-elasticity of the supply, noted  , which is calculated according
to the expression (9).
17Table 1 : Supply of green-pepper for Weibull demand
Econometric estimations (94July/2000Nov.)(∗)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Ln(1/α)1 /βη   R2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
δ =0 7 .43 0.3302 − 0.0679 0.29 0.407
(468.9) (6.99) (2.76)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
δ =0 .57 .27 0.4028 − 0.0677 0.29 0.407
(206.6) (6.984) (2.76)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-
δ =0 .96 .75 0.6344 − 0.0680 0.28 0.407
(62.8) (6.98) (2.76)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(*) Values in parenthesis are t-Student statistics.
1. The 1% signiﬁcance points of the Durbin − Watson statistics show the same
value 1.88 in all cases, which leads to accept the hypothesis of noncorrelated residuals.
The p−value for the F statistics in White heteroskedasticity test (with cross terms)
is 0.45, indicating that we can accept the homoskedasticity assumption.
2. The results are particularly stable w.r.t. the eﬃciency of liquidation markets
18for peppers. Figure 3 depicts the estimated curves (8) for δ =0 ,0.5,0.9. Surprisingly,
for retail prices beyond R$1.000/ton. they do indeed coincide at each level of the
recovering costs. The same feature is also observed by assuming Pareto or uniform
distributions, so that the constancy of the supply does not seems speciﬁct ot h e
present demand assumption. For other vegetables traded in the same market, like
potatoes, tomatoes and chayote, the estimated supply and density curves shift upward
and to the left, respectively, as δ increases. However, unlike for green-peppers, the
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FIG.3: Supply of green-pepper for Weibull demand. δ =0 , 0.5 , 0.9.
Figure 4 below depicts the estimated density of the demand for pepper for δ =0
(on the right); δ =0 .5 (central curve) and δ =0 .9 (asymmetric curve on the left).
19The curves shift to the left as the liquidation market becomes more eﬃcient. However,
quantity adjustments are implied but only on the demand side, not on the supply side.
Does this legitimate the presumption that noncompetitive practices are in force in the
retail segment? Only extra-sample information might conﬁrm such a hypothesis. One
possible explanation is that sellers manipulate prices to clear the secondary markets
in any circumstances. So, when there is an excess (insuﬃciency) of supply, they
avoid losses by cutting (rising) prices in order to adjust the demand to the quantities
available. Obviously, this behavior is replicated throughout the distribution channel
so that, at the price payed by the consumers, the same aggregate supply is optimal,
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FIG.4: Estimated Weibull demand of green-peppers. δ =0(curve on right);
δ =0 .5 (central); δ =0 .9 (left).
203. The long-run price-elasticity of the supply, calculated from (9) is estimated at
0.29.S i n c e Sp = − Dc,a10% increase in the retail( wholesale) price increases(reduces)
the supply at retail(the demand at wholesale) about 2.9%.
4. International comparisons. Few estimations of supply curves for green-peppers
have some international visibility. Málaga et alii (2001) obtain values 0.08 and 0.12 for
the elasticity of the producers’ supply of bell-peppers in Mexico (export market) and
USA (domestic market), respectively. These values are lower than that obtained
here at retail (0.29).W i t hy e a r l yd a t ao nv e g e t a b l e st r a d e di nt h eA m e r i c a nm a r k e t
(1960 − 1993),Y o uet alii(1997) use the Almost Ideal Demand System(AIDS) to
estimate price-elasticities of the demand of several perishables. For peppers, the
value obtained is −0.13. However, our ﬁnding (−0.29) is not directly comparable,
because it is calculated for the wholesale segment. Further, the AIDS model allows
for substitution, whereas we estimate an univariate demand equation.
4.4 Proﬁtability and losses
The nontruncate Weibull distribution function provided the best ﬁtting of the
data. Since sales for certain to loyal clients are estimated to be 0,i ti sn a t u r a lt o
ask if the random factors aﬀecting the demand at retail are strong enough to causes
signiﬁcant losses in the green-pepper distribution chain. In order to answer this
question, we estimate the probability that the proﬁtability rate is nonpositive, at each
prices and supply levels. The proﬁtability rate is deﬁned by: R ≡ (pX−cS)/cS. The
21term pX is the gross revenue of the retailers when the aggregate demand is X, while
cS is the gross revenue of the wholesalers when the quantity sold is S. So, R is a gross
rate of return in the retail segment. The sample estimate of the demand distribution
is used to estimate the distribution of R. So, FR(r)=0for r<−1 and for, r N −1:
FR(r) ≡ P[R  r]=P[X  (1 − λ)S(r +1 ) ]=1− exp{−(α(1 − λ)S(r +1 ) ) β}
The estimated expected value of R is:
ER = 1
501.58(g 1/β)(1/e α)Γ(g 1/β) − 1=1 .111Γ(0.33025) − 1=2 .0053.
At the estimated expected value, the revenue of the retailers is about 3 times
the gross revenue of the wholesalers. The ﬁgure below depicts the estimated density
of R for δ =0 , by using the values e α =0 .0005926 and e β =3 .028 obtained from
the estimates of log(1/α) and 1/β g i v e ni nt h eﬁrst row of Table 1. Three curves
are represented, according to diﬀe r e n ts a m p l ev a l u e so f(1 − λ)S : the curve on the
left side is calculated with the maximum value (= 824.827), for periods of low sales;
the curve in the middle is calculated with the mean value (= 501.58), for periods
of normal sales; the curve on the right side is calculated with the minimum value
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FIG.5: Estimated density of the proﬁtability rate in the green-pepper
market. Periods of low sales ( left); normal sales (central), high sales (right)
The probability of losses of trading downstream in the pepper distribution chain is
evaluated by FR(0) = P[R  0].I nFigure 5 above this probability is calculated by the
area below the density for −1 <r 0. The values of the three areas corresponding to
the periods of low, normal and high sales are: 0.108 ; 0.025 and 0.0027, respectively.
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FIG.6: Estimated probability of losses in the green-pepper market
The sample probability mean is 2.9%. Of course, a much higher value might be
obtained if proﬁtability was measured net of trading costs (transportation + taxes
+ administrative costs). The calculated probability of losses decreases consistently
during the sample period and its variance also decreases as time goes on. By using a
linear trend, the probability decreases about 0.00037 points per month, which corre-
sponds to a fall of around 0.86 percent/month during the sample period. This can be
explained by the Real stabilization plan established by the Brazilian government in
1994, which succeeded in reducing the monthly inﬂation rate(IPC/FGV) from 32.1%
in 1994/July to 0.87% in 2000/November. Since most losses in the retail sector should
be caused by oversupply, the estimated mean may provide a better approximation of
t h er a t eo fwaste than that calculated from the estimated expected demand (16.34%
24of the mean supply). The value 2.9% is roughly similar as that obtained for tomatoes
(2.07%), and corresponds to 52 tons/month of peppers.
VI- Final comments
We hope the application made above has given a suggestive view of the empirical
possibilities opened by the present model. The sellers’ objective function takes into
account that the quantities unsold cannot be carried on from one period to another.
The demand is modelled by a probability distribution function F depending on prices.
This assumption does not preclude consumers’ cost minimization of utility maximiza-
tion. If Xi(p;θi) stands for the optimal demand of the individual i with preferences’
parameter θi,F (x,p;θ) indicates the proportion of consumers buying at the most x
quantities of the good, when the price vector is p. Thus, the parameter θ of the dis-
tribution function is related to the individual preferences θi.O n c e F is well-deﬁned,
the preferences’ parameters can be estimated from the data on quantities supplied
rather than on quantities demanded. This is an empirical aspect very useful, since
quantities supplied are normally better observed than quantities demanded are. Fur-
ther, the model is very general and can be applied to a large class of goods like fruits,
vegetables, medicines, newspapers, etc. Extensions were made to the autarchic model
in order to encompass nonprice interactions among the sellers. For each supplier, it
was assumed that the committed sales are signiﬁcant. Indications were given on how
to estimate the spillover coeﬃcients kij. These estimations allow each producer to
25know the predatory, neutral or beneﬁcial eﬀects of the nonprice marketing practices
of each of his partners. They require, of course, ﬁrm-level data.
In order to extend the present analysis, more ambitious eﬀorts could be taken in
two directions. The ﬁrst would be to assume price competition in the second stage.
The other one would be to focus on multiproduct sellers. Multivariate probability
distributions are required to model the demand in this case.
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